The Minnesota Vikings’ approach to second and long last year may have caused people to damage the interior of their homes. No drywall, television, or anything else in the Man Cave was safe as the Vikings ran the ball into submission after getting very little from their offense on first down.
As the score bug on TV flashed second and 10, it was another sign for fans to run to the fridge to grab a drink. The ensuing third-and-long play may as well have been sponsored by Home Depot; fans would require a trip to the hardware store after reacting to Kirk Cousins getting slammed into the turf in a must-pass situation.
After a drive that lasted around 40 seconds, the Vikings punted the ball away and hoped that a defense ranked 27th in yards allowed and 29th in points allowed would somehow come up with a stop.
They didn’t, and Minnesota finished with a 7-9 record.
The Vikings officially replaced Gary Kubiak with his son Klint earlier this week. And while continuity has its benefits, this is a situation Klint needs to avoid next season. Though Klint may look like a typical NFL nepotism hire, he brings a fresh perspective and worked under Kevin Stefanski during his first season in Minnesota. He specifically praised the knowledge he received from Stefanski, and it should be the foundation of his work as OC.
As long as Mike Zimmer is head coach, the Vikings will always be a team that prioritizes running the football. Kubiak’s most significant change should be how the Vikings run the ball, and he should use Stefanski’s offense as the blueprint.
The Cleveland Browns ran the football 48% of the time in 2020. That number isn’t far off from Minnesota’s 46% clip, but it doesn’t tell the entire story. Unlike the Vikings, who used second and third down to send their fans into the bargain drywall section, Stefanski took a different approach that helped Cleveland become a more efficient offense.
When the Browns got nothing on first down, they didn’t stubbornly stick to their ground-and-pound roots. On plays of second-and-10 yards or more, the Browns ran the ball just 26% of the time, the 10th lowest rate in the NFL.
They took a similar approach when they found success on early downs. The Browns ran the ball 51% of the time on second and third down plays that required three yards or less. While it brought a lower success rate, the yards per attempt through the pass (6.3) almost doubled what they gained when running the ball (3.6).
While Stefanski ran the ball to keep defenses off-balance, the Vikings were more predictable. They ran the ball 44 percent of the time on second and long, which was the second-highest rate in the NFL behind the Denver Broncos (45%). When Minnesota found success early in a drive, they kept pounding the football, running it 72% of the time on second-and-short and third-and-short situations.
This volume helped the Vikings become the fifth-ranked rushing offense in the league but came at the expense of limiting targets for Justin Jefferson, Adam Thielen, and the rest of the passing offense. With Minnesota opting to gain 3.4 yards on the ground instead of 6.9 yards through the air in those situations, they almost played tightrope football, trying to eliminate the odds of Cousins making a mistake.
Instead, the Vikings could play to Cousins’ strength in these situations. He had the fourth-highest passer rating off play-action in 2020 (122.3) and 2019 (129.2), but the percentage of those plays dipped from 31.4% in 2019 to 28.7% in 2020. By using more play-action on second and long and short-yardage situations, Cousins could find the efficiency he had in 2019, where he posted a career-high quarterback rating.
The Vikings can optimize their running game while committing to pass more. Last season, the Vikings ran 50% of the time in one-possession games (eight points or fewer). This wasn’t far off from Cleveland’s 48% clip, but again, it’s a matter of when they’re doing it.
When the Browns were in a one-possession game in the first half, they ran the ball just 43% of the time. This let the passing attack do the heavy lifting to allow them to hold the late-game hammer to help seal victories. Meanwhile, the Vikings ran the ball 48% of the time during one-possession games in the first half, including 52% of the time in the first quarter.
This was the biggest difference between Stefanski and Kubiak. The Browns opted to run the ball 56% of the time during one-possession games in the second half while the Vikings held steady at 53%.
Although the Browns passed more in these situations, it didn’t diminish their identity as a running team. Cleveland still ranked third in the NFL in rushing offense, and Stefanski was able to keep Nick Chubb and Kareem Hunt fresh for their playoff run.
Adding principles of Stefanski’s offense could help modernize the Vikings’ offense next year. This change would appease Zimmer’s desire to run the ball while also getting more of the explosive plays that were left behind by running in the same situations.
