Gorgui Dieng is a backup center. For the 2017-18 season, the Wolves’ fifth-year big man is averaging 17.5 minutes per game. Two hundred eighty-two of those minutes have come alongside Karl-Anthony Towns, but largely Dieng’s role is reserved to playing when Towns doesn’t.

This is a massive change for not only Dieng but the Wolves as a whole. In 2016-17, Dieng and Towns shared the floor for 2,159 minutes — 329 more minutes than any other big man pairing in the NBA.

After averaging 32.4 minutes per game a season ago, Dieng has become a 14-minute-a-night-guy. In seven February games, Dieng averaged exactly 14.1 minutes per game.

For those keen on NBA salaries, “14.1” is a key number when it comes to Dieng. That is his salary, this season, in millions.

Sure, these guys are getting paid more these days but a one-to-one ratio in minutes-to-millions is, well, not ideal. Even at his season average of 17.5 minutes per game, Dieng has the lowest such ratio in the Wolves’ rotation.

If this ratio is the raising of a red flag for Dieng’s “worth”, then the three years and $49.9 million left on the deal are the proverbial wavings of said flag. Dieng has become a negative asset in the simple calculation of marginal productivity minus salary owed.

If front offices knew what players would produce, there would be no such thing as positive assets or negative assets. It’s a guessing game of sorts. In ways, contract negotiations are akin to the draft process — a skill development prognostication. There is a revisionist history of overpaid/underpaid contracts just as there is a revision to players that are over-drafted or under-drafted.

The often impossible goal on the team side is to have a roster full of players who pass the marginal productivity test positively. This is easier said than done, though, due to market constraints in the negotiation process.

In the context of the Wolves, we have examples of such constraints. The Minnesota players that clearly have productivity levels that exceed their salary are on their first contract — their rookie deal.

“Minutes-to-Millions” is not a perfect example of marginal productivity, but on the above table, you can see that the three players with the best ratio (Jones, Towns, and Wiggins) are all on rookie deals. This is because there is little market constraint on rookie deals; salaries are pre-determined so as to intentionally be cost-effective.

For example, Towns was the first pick in the 2015 draft and has a pre-determined salary of $6.2 million in, now, his third year. Jones was the 24th pick in the same draft, his salary is $1.5 million.

Following their rookie deal — often entering year five, like Dieng — players hit the market and thus those market constraints. These constraints are influenced by the league’s collective bargaining agreement (the legal document that details salary parameters, amongst other things). If printed out, the CBA would look like David Foster Wallace’s gargantuan novel Infinite Jest, but with more footnotes.

In so many words, the CBA details what you can and cannot pay players and who can or cannot pay them. It leads to uncomfortable risk calculations that if assessed correctly lead to positive assets and if assessed ineffectively: Negative assets.

The league at-large is currently recovering from its biggest miscalculation spree ever, an assessment that touched Dieng and his 4-year, $64 million deal.

The Summer That “Made It Rain”

The collective bargaining agreement allowed for a massive salary cap spike in the summer of 2016. This spike was funded by a $24 billion television contract, a deal that injected $2.6 billion in annual revenue to the league. On a team-to-team basis, this meant an influx of money that had to be spent prior to the 2016 season.

Each team’s salary cap is loosely calculated as 1.67 percent of total league revenue. The players and owners split the revenue in half and the players half is then divided into the 30 team’s rosters. In 2016, that meant a salary cap of $94.1 million, up from $70 million the year prior. A big ole spike.

Infamously, this space gifted the Golden State Warriors and their owner Joe Lacob the ability to sign 2016 unrestricted free agent Kevin Durant. That deal was obviously a coup for the Warriors but the majority of that summer’s spendings were done so irresponsibly. For the other owners, the spike was treated like tax returns.

A few people (franchises) invested the money wisely but most bought themselves a Playstation.

Here’s a list of summer 2016 game consoles purchased:

• Meyers Leonard, Portland Trail Blazers: Four years, $41 million
• Solomon Hill, New Orleans Pelicans: Four years, $52 million
• Bismack Biyombo, Orlando Magic: Four years, $72 million
• Miles Plumlee, Milwaukee Bucks: Four years, $52 million
• Nicolas Batum, Charlotte Hornets: Five years, $120 million
• Chandler Parsons, Memphis Grizzlies: Four years, $94.8 million
• Luol Deng, Los Angeles Lakers: Four years, $72 million
• Ian Mahinmi, Washington Wizards: Four years, $64 million
• Timofey Mozgov, Los Angeles Lakers: Four years, $64 million
• Joakim Noah, New York Knicks: Four years, $72 million

Technically, Dieng does not make the list because he wasn’t officially a free agent that summer. The contract he signed was one of those DFW footnotes — a “rookie contract extension”.

A rookie contract extension functions similar to a free agent dealing in that it is a negotiation for a new deal; the difference is that the bidding is not happening in the open market, players can only sign rookie contract extensions with their current team. The team side and player side try to find a fair cost.

If a mutually agreed on price isn’t found, the player rides out the final year of his rookie deal and become a free agent the following summer, on the open market.

Often times these extensions are obvious moves. The elite players sign for max dollars that would be very likely to receive on the open market and the middling players often sign at a discount so as to lock-in personal financial security.

Dieng’s deal meets neither criterion; his rookie contract extension was inked three months after the 2016 summer of Making It Rain, yet he still signed for $64 million — the market rate of a starting center. See: Ian Mahinmi and Timofey Mozgov’s four-year deals for $64 million.

The difference in Dieng’s deal is that it did not kick in until this season, while Mahinmi and Mozgov are in Year Two. Again, that is how rookie contract extensions work, they come one year in advance of free agency.

Becuase Dieng was signed late and because the deal didn’t kick in at the same time, he often does not get put under the umbrella of the summer of 2016. In ways, he probably should be put there because the deal was an overpay influenced by the cap spike.

But it also should not be put under that umbrella because, well, Dieng can still play.

Gorgui Dieng is Not Timofey Mozgov or Joakim Noah

Every player on the above list is either:

1. Completely out of their team’s rotation (Noah, Mozgov, Deng, Leonard)
2. Perpetually injured (Parsons, Hill)
3. On one of the worst teams in the league (Batum, Plumlee, Biyombo)
4. Played out of complete necessity (Mahinmi).

Dieng does not fall into any of those categories. The Wolves big man is actually in the team’s rotation, rarely injured, on one of the league’s best teams, and plays because his team needs him.

Dieng may be a negative asset in the sense that other teams are not clamoring to acquire his production given his salary but he is also not a negative contributor for the Wolves when he plays.

It would be easy to look at Dieng’s averages and disagree with this. Some would point to his numbers that suggest he has fallen off from a season ago.

But that would be an unfair representation. Again, in 2016-17, Dieng played 32.4 minutes per game, playing time that has been nearly halved in 2017-18. When extrapolated to a per-minute basis, Dieng’s season is not a statistical step back.

The contrary: Dieng has improved in the majority of box score metrics.

Really, his impact isn’t even recognized in these simple statistics. In many ways, Dieng holds real value in the idea that his strengths are team-wide weaknesses of the Wolves: defense and shooting.

Dieng’s Defense

Other than Ricky Rubio, Dieng was the lone bright spot of the Wolves 27th ranked defense from a season ago. According to ESPN’s Defensive Real Plus-Minus statistic, he was the best defender on the team.

While RPM is regarded in the analytics community as one of the best metrics — specifically for defense — it is imperfect. Many are quick to suggest that these analytics can overrate a player under the logic of: How can you be a good defender on a bad team defense? 

For those who carry that sentiment, there are other — perhaps better — ways to measure defensive production.

Tom Thibodeau suggested a few of those measurements to the media at a practice in mid-January when asked his opinion on defensive metric systems.

“I’ve seen most of the defensive rating systems and I know it’s something that a lot of people talk about but I still haven’t seen one that is very accurate,” said Thibodeau, who went on to describe how he leans on film to discern defensive effectiveness. “It’s containment of the ball. (It’s) challenging shots. Can you defend your position? Can you defend multiple positions? Do you read situations?”

Perhaps it is the juxtaposition of style between Dieng and Towns, but Towns’ backup has laid out plenty of film that checks these eye-test anecdotes Thibodeau laid out. Though not the traditional rim-defender nor the uber-athletic big who can scat on the perimeter, Dieng does read situations at a high level.

There is a calm to his game that is reminiscent of Andrew Bogut. While Dieng isn’t racking up blocks like the former Defensive Player of the Year, he is an effective dropping center who moves his feet and makes up for a lack of shot-blocking chops with active hands.

In watching the Wolves play defense, there is often a sense of this isn’t sinking in. Jimmy Butler and Taj Gibson get it but they have played the better part of their careers in the Thibs System. For the new guys, Dieng is the only player who appears to have Butler-ian or Gibson-ian levels of understanding.

Dieng is hyper-aware of the entire floor — perhaps the key element of successful pick-and-roll defense. There is not an obsession with his man, rather a calm and meticulous discernment of what is happening. This comes as a welcome change from other players in the rotation who follow the ball like a puppy chasing a laser pointer’s dot.

Dieng’s Shooting

Dirk Nowitzki is largely regarded as one of the best mid-range shooters of all-time and of big men he is king. No, this is not a Dieng is as good as Dirk argument/comparison.

Okay, it kind of is. Bear with me.

Nowitzki’s best shooting season of his career was 2010-11. Unsurprisingly, the year Dallas won the championship. That season, Dirk shot a scorching 51 percent on 2-point shots from 10-23 feet.

While Dieng is nowhere near the isolation player Nowitzki was (or probably still is), this season Dieng is shooting 51 percent on 2-point shots from that same 10-23 feet distance. Yes, in many ways this is apples to oranges; Dirk’s shots were largely contested and Dieng’s attempts are often wide open.

There is another flaw in Dieng’s offensive game: 2s are worth less than 3s. Even at 51 percent, a 2-point attempt is worth the same in expected value as a 34 percent 3-point attempt. Considering the league-average from 3 is 36.1 percent this season, even being a money-mid-ranger only adds so much value.

While certain teams have rightfully excommunicated themselves from these middle-distance shots, it is not as if the look has no value. An open mid-range shot will always be better than a wild and double-teamed look from anywhere. A 15-foot jumper is also, of course, better than a shot clock violation.

The shot clock aspect is particularly pertinent for the Wolves and, in turn, Dieng. Only the Memphis Grizzlies shoot more shots “late” in the shot clock as defined by NBA.com’s tracking data.

Watch any Wolves game and there is a patient prodding – at times monotonous – feeling to their offensive attack. That feeling quickly turns to irritation in the instances where the shot clock sounds and the ball is turned over.

That said, the Wolves are the league’s second-most effective team “very late” in the shot clock (four or fewer seconds remaining). This isn’t a great accolade to have but given the conscious choice to be a patient team, finding effectiveness here is key.

Of course, Jimmy Butler — and to a lesser extent Andrew Wiggins and Jamal Crawford — can create with little time and space but it is advantageous to be surrounded by other players who can knock down a jumper.

Dieng is perhaps the team’s most apt weapon here. Not because he is the best shooter but because defensive focus often turns to the ball in these situations and thus away from Dieng. When this happens, Dieng becomes a sneaky great option.

Having Dieng spot up from 10-16 feet — where he is shooting 59.1 percent from on the season — is a windfall; equal in value to a 39.4 percent 3-point shooter.

Insulating The Big Three

To draw another optimistic parallel, the Minnesota roster infrastructure is reminiscent of the Miami Heat Big Three from years ago. While Butler-Towns-Wiggins are definitively a poor man’s version of those Miami weapons, there are similarities. Notably, the isolation aptitudes of the Wolves’ three go-to options but the tertiary pieces also have a likeness.

In the Heat analogy, Dieng is Udonis Haslem. While on the floor for the Heat, Haslem was clearly not a primary option, but he was an option.

When defenses would hone in on the primary options in Miami, Haslem would live ready-to-fire from midrange. Was Haslem an analytical darling in Miami? Uh, no. But there was a time and place for a Haslem jumper; often late in the shot clock.

Perhaps the difference in Wade shooting this shot or passing is trivial but there is an empirical value. It may not jump off the stat sheet in the shots made over shots attempted column of the box score, but having a player out there who your primary options are confident in matters.

“I’m not one for the statistics I don’t know what people shoot,” Jimmy Butler told Zone Coverage before the All-Star break. “But, yeah, I’m confident (in Dieng).

He’s a player. Continues to grow every single year. He’s done a phenomenal job at that. He’s confident in his abilities and he goes out there and he hoops. What more can you ask for?”

The parallel between Haslem and Dieng doesn’t stop at mid-range shooting or even defense for that matter. Teams with high usage players  — and personalities — need teammates that are content with a smaller role. The whole “there is only one basketball” adage can be a real thing.

Even last season, when Dieng was playing starter minutes, he was willing to cede to the players who surrounded him. This propped up the development of Towns and Wiggins who had usage percentages nearly double Dieng’s and allowed the guards (Rubio and LaVine) to facilitate the offense.

This season has been an extension of that same ideology. Dieng’s role diminishing was a price paid in order to bound ahead in team-wide effectiveness — last season the Wolves finished third-to-last in the Western Conference. This season they have the third-most wins in the West.

This selflessness does not show in any statistic that measures marginal productivity and therefore, in ways, should discredit at least some of the overpaid labeling. If the Wolves are finding team success and Dieng’s on-floor performance is solid — even if in small doses — then the contract is okay.

“It’s not about numbers. It’s not,” said Butler when speaking about Dieng and the other bench pieces. “A lot of things that go into winning are things that you can’t measure.”

The Pricetag Of Winning

In 2005, the Miami Heat lost to the Detroit Pistons in the Eastern Conference Finals. That season marked the end of Haslem’s rookie contract. The Heat were posed with the question of retaining Haslem or letting him hit the market.

Miami’s front office opted to dole out a 5-year, $30.25 million deal to Haslem. In 2005, the league’s salary cap was $49.5 million — exactly half of today’s cap. This means, in modern dollars, the deal from ’05 is equivalent to $60.5 million, just a tick below Dieng’s rate.

That deal, when thrown into the marginal productivity versus salary equation, would have certainly come out negative. But Miami did it. While process is usually a better measuring stick than results when it comes to contracts, this deal tangentially rendered some serious results.

The Heat won the championship that next season. Turns out that Miami team didn’t need a player that met certain statistical criterion; they just needed someone who could hoop.

Haslem and that deal did not just benefit Miami for those next five years; he’s still on the team twelve years later. Six years after signing the deal in ’05, when James and Bosh came to town, Haslem took a discount in salary and role to make things fit. Every future deal Haslem signed — despite a growing cap — was for a lesser annual amount than that 2005 deal. The Heat took care of Haslem early on and he, in turn, continues to take care of the Heat in whatever role (and salary) is available.

Dieng may not be long for the Wolves. Who knows, with future financial restrictions, maybe he will need to be shown the door in the not-so-distant future. But for now, he is a player that is probably overpaid for his production but clearly works in this iteration of the Minnesota Timberwolves. There are far worse contracts out there with far more irritable personalities attached to them.

Dieng is just here to hoop. For now, that is enough.

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Dane Moore

Dane Moore is Zone Coverage's staff writer covering the Minnesota Timberwolves. Dane has been covering the Wolves in various capacities since the inception of the Tom Thibodeau era -- which was a really weird place to start his NBA writing career. You can find Dane's coverage of the Timberwolves and the NBA with Charlie Johnson at Zone Coverage and on The Dane Moore NBA Podcast. The goal is perpetuating a love of the game and elevating the basketball conversation -- because that's what Nikola Pekovic would want. (Will talk about jump hooks.)

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