After a couple of months of uncertainty, the Minnesota Vikings’ plan at QB is starting to materialize. GM Kwesi Adofo-Mensah allowed Kirk Cousins to walk to the Atlanta Falcons and then quickly traded with the Houston Texans to get the 23rd-overall pick in the 2024 NFL Draft:
Making this trade over a month before the draft clearly indicates that the Vikings are building ammo to offer a package to get one of the top QBs in the draft. Although it feels as if Minnesota would target Drake Maye or J.J. McCarthy in a trade-up scenario, we can’t know the exact player they are targeting at this point. But we can look at what it would cost to move up in the draft, considering the Vikings’ resources and historical trade options. With that information, we can determine whether or not we think each QB is worth the price.
How do we evaluate a draft trade?
While each team has its value formula for draft picks, there are also publicly available charts. Jimmy Johnson created one, supposedly the first to create this kind of analytical metric. That chart and the one Rich Hill from Pats Pulpit calculated using historical trade data make up what I call the “market value” component of a trade. In essence, this is what teams are typically willing to pay or accept for a trade up or down a board.
However, other models look at outcomes based on draft position and attempt to calculate a true value for each pick. I’ll refer to these as the “analytical value” draft charts. These charts come from Chase Stuart, a Harvard blog, Fitzgerald-Spielberger, and Ben Baldwin.
The market value charts prefer trades up, while the analytical value charts prefer teams to trade down. That can be seen in the different values each gave Minnesota’s 2022 draft trades:
The recent trade with Houston is another example to look at. Let’s look at how the Vikings did based on the various charts:
On its face, you could say the Vikings made a bad trade, particularly from an analytics perspective. They lost the equivalent of a third- or fourth-round pick in value for the trade. However, the market disagrees. The difference on Jimmy Johnson‘s chart is essentially the loose change of a late-round pick, and Rich Hill’s chart suggests that the Vikings won the trade by about the cost of a late fourth-round pick.
I generally prefer the analytical value charts and would typically see this as a bad trade. But analytical charts come with a caveat, and that is for quarterbacks. If a team is trading up for a quarterback, it should be generally seen as good value because of the position’s importance.
As Baldwin puts it:
I havenāt seen a draft value chart that satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Is made with publicly available code and data
2. Shows a draft value curve when excluding quarterbacks
The latter point is especially important. If one combines quarterbacks and non-quarterbacks when constructing a draft value chart, one ends up much too rosy on the value of the top picks in the draft when these picks are not used on a quarterback.Ā This is due to quarterbacks being very valuable, and quarterbacks selected high in the draft tending to have higher hit rates.
This PFF article illustrates the probability differences between drafting a quarterback and drafting a position player. Before the 2020 draft, they theorized that if the Washington Commanders planned to take a position player, they would benefit from trading down from No. 2 and asking for just No. 7 and No. 38 in return. However, the return on trading up for a QB was so massive that the Miami Dolphins could have sent picks No. 5, 16, and 26 in that draft and still won the trade.
It’s generally smart to win on the analytics side of trades. But in the case of trading up for a QB, which the Vikings plan on doing if they can trade up, we should be more concerned with the market value of the trade package than the analytical value. Given that, I would argue that the Vikings came out slightly ahead in their trade with the Texans.
What’s the cost for a trade up?
Trades up to the top three have generally been pretty expensive. In 2012, Washington sent No. 6, No. 39, and first-round picks in 2013 and 2014 to trade up for Robert Griffin III. In 2016, the Los Angeles Rams sent a bevy of picks, including No. 15, No. 43, No. 45, No. 76, and their first and third in 2017 for the privilege to draft Jared Goff. Meanwhile, the Philadelphia Eagles sent No. 8, No. 77, No. 100, and a 2017 first and 2018 second for Carson Wentz. Finally, the San Francisco 49ers sent No. 12, a first and third in 2022, and a first in 2023 for Trey Lance in 2021.
Most of these trades come out as “Poor” on the market value chart in my calculator. In the worst one, the RGIII trade, Washington lost the value of about a mid-second-round pick. But the Rams won their trade and gained the equivalent of a second-round pick in the Goff trade based on the market value charts.
It seems like the Chicago Bears and Washington are staying at No. 1 and 2 while picking QBs. That means Minnesota’s first opportunity is to trade up with the New England Patriots to No. 3. Trading the No. 11 and No. 23 picks to New England would end up being about average value for a QB trade based on the market value chart:
Given historical trades, though, that isn’t likely to be enough. What if the Vikings add their 2025 first into the trade? The results are below:
The Vikings cost themselves quite a bit in this scenario, which is more than previous teams have had to spend to move up to this position in the draft. I think there’s a happy medium: sending the team’s 2026 first.
This solution offers a happy medium for the Vikings and New England trading out. The Patriots get good value, but Minnesota’s trade with the Texans means they get to keep their first in 2025. That sets them up to add another high-value player rather than having to mortgage their first-rounders for three consecutive years like the 49ers did. While it came at the cost of a pair of second-round picks, the team can still consistently add talent in 2025 and 2026.
Finally, there is another option if the Patriots decide it is their time to take a QB at No. 3. The Vikings could move up to No. 4 with the Arizona Cardinals or No. 5 with the Los Angeles Chargers. The cost should decrease in this case because neither team is in the market for a QB. That makes trading just pick No. 11 and No. 23 feasible. The team trading out gets good value, while Minnesota retains its future picks. Let’s take a look at a potential trade up to No. 5.
First-round picks aren’t the only pieces the Vikings can send, but it’s hard to predict a different combination before a trade actually happens. The firsts will get Minnesota in the ballpark and later picks to even out the trade can be added later.
In all, it’s going to be difficult for the Vikings to “win” a trade up for a quarterback based on the traditional value of draft picks. But even if they have to spend No. 11, No. 23, and a 2025 first to trade up for a quarterback, remember the conclusion from the PFF article above ā a quarterback with a profile that suggests he’s worth an early pick overrides a vast overpay in moving up.
Now the Vikings just need to determine which QBs in the draft are worth moving up for.
