Running backs across the league are starting to balk at their value, and the Minnesota Vikings have been at the forefront of the discussion.
The Vikings made headlines early in the offseason when they did everything they could to telegraph Dalvin Cook’s departure. Many fans value the running back, who ran for over 1,100 yards in each of the past four seasons. However, Cook’s salary of just over $14 million was a scarlet letter to front offices.
They released Cook and more trouble followed. He has yet to sign with a team as he waits for the perfect contract. Meanwhile, other running backs like Saquon Barkley and Josh Jacobs are beginning holdouts as they wait for their teams to make long-term offers.
After Austin Ekeler tried and failed to reach a new deal with the Los Angeles Chargers, he reportedly organized a Zoom summit with some of the league’s top running backs last weekend. However, with nine years left on the league’s collective bargaining agreement, what can the league do?
Robert Smith suggested restricting the franchise tag.
Appearing on KFAN last week, Smith said that he believes the franchise tag should be restricted to quarterbacks only, but also understands why teams are reluctant to make long-term commitments to the position.
“You need to ask for these things beforehand, but I wish that the franchise tag could only be applied to quarterbacks,” Smith said. “That might help some of this. But at the same time, it comes down to where are you going to spend your money, and running back just isn’t the place.”
Smith’s comments make a lot of sense when you think about them. The NFL created the franchise tag in 1993 as a way for teams to keep their most valuable players and reduce the risk of signing them to a long-term deal. The franchise take allows teams to sign them to a one-year tender worth the average of the top five salaries at their position.
Players have criticized the tag as a loophole to limit their leverage in contract negotiations. However, the money in the deal is adequate in relation to their position. For example, this year’s franchise tag at quarterback was $32.4 million. For reference, that’s in between Kirk Cousins ($35 million) and Jared Goff ($33.5 million) in average annual value.
Edge rushers also get a fair number with the tag. This year’s figure of $19.7 million would come in just under Von Miller’s $20 million per season but just above Cameron Jordan and Harold Landry, who each have an annual average value of $17.5 million per season.
With quarterback, edge rusher, and wide receiver ($19.7 million) regarded as premium positions, the franchise tag usually serves as a Band-Aid to get something done. But that’s not the way it’s been used with running backs.
Running backs are different in that most of their production comes in their rookie deal. While there are outliers like Cook, most teams are looking to get younger and cheaper at the position. That’s become even more prominent as more teams use the Shanahan-inspired zone-based scheme.
That puts everyone in a bad position. A team like the Vikings could sign Cook to a second contract. Or they can dig deep in the draft knowing that a player like Isiah Pacheco wouldn’t offer the same production, but the drop-off wouldn’t be something that sinks their offense.
It also makes drafting running backs in the first round tricky. With the rookie pay scale adopted by the NFL in 2011, teams can get a running back at an affordable rate – especially in the back half of the first round.
Let’s say the Vikings decided to pull the trigger on seventh-round draft pick DeWayne McBride in the first round. Sitting at the 23rd-overall pick, Minnesota could sign McBride to a four-year contract worth $13.7 million according to Over The Cap.
With a $2.4 million cap number in the first year, $3.1 million in the second year, $3.7 million in the third year, and $4.3 million in the final year, a team could get a bargain with that player – especially if they outperform their contract.
But that’s where things get messy. A running back who gets over 200 carries is likely to produce the numbers a team is looking for. However, it also opens up a need for security, especially in a position that handles the ball more than anyone outside of the quarterback.
Barkley and Jacobs have run into these issues as their career years have created a problem. The New York Giants were willing to give Daniel Jones $40 million a year because, as a quarterback, there are rules to protect that investment. Even for the Las Vegas Raiders, there’s a better chance that Davante Adams will make it to the end of his $28 million per year contract thanks to the rules in place on defenseless receivers.
For running backs, there are no such rules. If the defense wants to hit them high, they can hit them high. If the defense wants to go low, they can do that too. Outside of a horse-collar tackle, running backs have a huge target on their back, which increases the volatility and the need for long-term security.
“Part of the equation has to be risk,” Smith explained. It’s not just the value that we think you provide, but the risk especially beyond a one-year deal for running backs. … I mean, that’s just the reality of the situation.”
Smith went on to reference a two-year, $26 million deal that Saquon Barkley reportedly turned down. While Barkley would likely like a long-term deal, the Giants were only willing to go two years but were willing to go over the current franchise tag by $3 million per season.
“If that’s the case, you have to understand [that] I can play as hard as I can, look tough and talk all of this solidarity stuff,” Smith said. “But at some point, it becomes dollars and cents and the older he gets, the more carries he takes. The more carries he takes, the more hits he takes. The more hits he takes, the less value he has moving forward.”
So what do NFL front offices do in this situation? They use the franchise tag.
This year’s $10.09 million franchise tag was the lowest tag number in the NFL outside of special teamers ($5.3 million). The number is also lower than some the other positions that NFL front offices deem replaceable such as safety ($14.4 million) and linebacker ($20.9 million).
A $10 million cap number is easier for general managers to tolerate for one season. If Barkley or Jacobs fall off a cliff, it gives them the flexibility to search for a new option.
Eliminating the tag for non-quarterback positions is one way the NFL could work around this deal, but so is a shorter term for running backs in the draft. If a running back was required to sign a two- or three-year deal upon their entry into the league, teams could still reap the benefits of a cheap contract for two seasons before deciding whether they want to pay for elite production long-term.
That’s what happened in Smith’s case. He signed a two-year deal as a first-round pick in 1993 and ran through two straight injury-plagued seasons before the Vikings hit him with the transition tag in 1995. Smith negotiated a deal elsewhere and the Vikings were able to have the first right of refusal, allowing both teams to get what they want.
But this is also why the NFL implemented a rookie pay scale in the first place. Owners wanted the ability not only to regulate the amount of money that was being given in these deals, but they also wanted to maintain team control for as long as possible.
“[Former NFLPA president Gene Upshaw] would say this all the time that the owners…are not doing this out of the kindness of their hearts,” Smith recalled. “They want to be able to control what they can do. So they want players under control as long as possible and this rookie wage scale was a part of it.”
It gets back to the idea that something needs to be done. While there are other pay disparities in the NFL (such as tight end and safety), running backs like Phillip Lindsay have gotten the short straw, running for 2,848 yards over five seasons but making just $4.3 million.
Things probably won’t change until a new CBA is negotiated in 2030. But for now, Smith might be on the right path to solving the NFL’s running back problem.
