There has been plenty of concern surrounding Kirk Cousins over the course of a sputtering 1-3 start for the Vikings. One of the most common is an accusation that Cousins lacks necessary aggression. He has a reputation for declining risky deep throws in favor of safe but unproductive checkdowns. Quarterback play, however, is a lot more complicated than that.
Aggression usually refers to two things for quarterbacks: depth of target and the size of throwing windows. With the technology we have now, we can look up both of these things and see where Cousins ranks. Among quarterbacks with at least 70 attempts so far, Cousins ranks first with 12.1 average yards per target, according to Pro Football Focus.
Cousins throws more bombs than anyone in the league. He ranks first among quarterbacks with at least 30 attempts with 25 of his 100 pass attempts so far going past 20 yards. The results are mixed, with a few Hail Mary interceptions and some iffy accuracy, but the Vikings’ passing offense is anything but conservative.
Next Gen Stats considers a tight window to be any throw with a defender a yard or closer to the receiver. By that measure, Cousins throws into tight windows more than all but five quarterbacks in the league. His attempts also average about 1.6 yards past the sticks, the fifth furthest in the NFL. So why does Cousins have this reputation?
He throws into plenty of tight windows, but Next Gen Stats and PFF can’t chart the passing opportunities he declines. Take the example below: The Texans are in Cover 1, a man-to-man coverage. Justin Jefferson is 1-on-1 with Phillip Gaines, running a corner route with outside leverage. That means he’s on the correct side of Gaines to make separation in the end zone. But the safety drifts to Jefferson’s side just a little, and Cousins declines the throw.
[videopress UW6fTbqd]That is an exceedingly conservative decision that Cousins makes despite having an excellent throwing window between the cornerback and safety. He completes a tight pass, but clearly made the safe, unproductive throw here. The Vikings would settle for a field goal after throwing short of the sticks on this 3rd and 6.
Another example comes in the second half, where Cousins takes a sack despite Jefferson having space downfield. The Vikings are running a flood concept to the right with a player deep, intermediate and shallow. The Texans’ quarters coverage has an answer to this, with the safety taking the deep route, the other safety and cornerback taking the intermediate route, and a linebacker taking the shallow route. So Thielen ends up double covered, and Jefferson ends up 1-on-1 with safety Justin Reid.
[videopress rGbKfgbS]Cousins has all the space between Jefferson and the sideline to work with, and Jefferson has the speed to leave Reid in the dust. Instead, he declines that throw and tries to scramble, which leads to a sack and 3rd and 11.
What is frustrating to evaluate is that Cousins doesn’t always make these mistakes. On the aforementioned 3rd and 11, Jefferson is covered well by Vernon Hargreaves, and the safety is crashing over to contest the throw. Cousins fits it into a tight window for a very improbable conversion.
[videopress WwhFX4BM]Here, the best of Cousins is on display, threading the needle to his contested catch expert to convert on 3rd and long in the face of a massive hit. There’s not much more you can ask for. Later on that drive, he hits Jefferson on another tight window.
[videopress 77DUOcJE]To make this throw, Cousins needs to trust in not only his own arm, but also Jefferson’s ability to adjust to an awkward ball. Bradley Roby has denied Cousins every part of the window except for Jefferson’s back shoulder. That is an incredibly difficult catch for Jefferson, who pays off Cousins’ faith.
So what’s the difference between risks Cousins takes and the ones he won’t? The simplest theory is inconsistency: His ability to identify a deep opportunity is a play-to-play proposition. But there’s another pattern that could explain that inconsistency.
Most play designs have if-then coverage rules that determine the first read. If the safety goes left, you throw right, and vice versa. In the first play, the safety drifts toward Jefferson’s side, and that tells Cousins to move off the throw. In the second, if the safety picks up Jefferson, he’s told to move on from Jefferson in the progression rather than test that matchup. In both completions, the safety is a non-factor. In the first, he’s late enough to the play to give Cousins a window, and in the second, the safety turns his attention elsewhere in the play.
Cousins has proven that he will test 1-on-1 matchups he expects, even if the coverage is tight. That’s a good choice in situations where Thielen and Jefferson would be targets, since their contested catch ability de-emphasizes the need for separation. But he won’t test the range of a safety if the play design instructs him so, no matter who that safety is or which receiver it challenges. That puts a lot of pressure on play design to work as intended, and removes a ton of pressure from the pass catchers to get separation against man coverage. But it can also waste elite plays from elite receivers and the opportunities that creates.
Perhaps a conversation for another day is the effect this tendency had on Stefon Diggs and his experience playing for the Vikings.
I wouldn’t call Cousins a conservative quarterback, however. Conservative play, as we mostly discuss it, involves quarterbacks throwing short of the sticks or checking down too often. That’s not a factor for Cousins, but he needs to be more aggressive to bring out the best in his receivers.
